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abstract: this research focuses on the relationship between corporate governance and perfor-
mance in the largest european listed banks, which have been studied to a lesser extent within this 
field. the study is based on agency theory and we use a sample of 404 observations referring to 
97 banks selected from the annual ranking of the 2,000 biggest companies in the world prepared 
by Forbes. the paper covers the period from 2006 to 2010, thus, examining the changes in the 
performance drivers in the recent financial crisis. on the basis of the panel data analysis, we confirm 
that the variety of governance factors including board size, insider appointed, directors’ age, board 
meetings and affiliated committees influence the performance of the banks. this paper contributes 
to a better understanding of the effect of corporate governance on the financial performance of the 
financial companies in times of high capital market volatility. 
Keywords: Corporate governance; bank performance; agency theory; financial crisis.
introduction
larcker, Richardson and tuna (2007) argue that the lack of consistent em-
pirical results on the influence of corporate governance on performance is 
due to the difficulty in adequately measuring corporate governance and, 
in that context, identify fourteen corporate governance factors. Based 
on these factors and on agency theory, Grove, Patelli, victoravich and Xu 
(2011) study the influence of corporate governance on the performance of 
U.s. banks.
the study of commercial banks and financial institutions is particularly rel-
evant given the importance of the financial sector in the modern economy, 
thus, requiring specific regulations and supervision by market authorities. 
this importance became very clear during the recent international crisis 
since the banks were subject to specific interventions from central banks 
and governments (Friedman, 2011) aiming to maintain confidence in the 
markets (Zingales, 2008).
gobernanZa corporatiVa y desempeño de los bancos 
cotiZados de mayor tamaño de eUropa dUrante la crisis 
económica 
resUmen: esta investigación se enfoca en la relación entre la gober-
nanza corporativa y el desempeño de los bancos cotizados en la bolsa y de 
mayor tamaño de europa, que es un tema menos estudiado dentro de este 
campo. el estudio se basa en la teoría de agencia, y usamos una muestra 
de 404 observaciones, que se refieren a 97 bancos seleccionados del ran-
king anual de Forbes de las 2000 compañías mundiales de mayor tamaño. 
el artículo cubre el período de 2006 a 2010, y por lo tanto examina los 
cambios en los indicadores de rendimiento dentro de la reciente crisis eco-
nómica. Con base en el análisis de datos de panel confirmamos que la 
variedad de factores de gobernanza, incluyendo el tamaño de la junta, el 
nombramiento interno, la edad de los directores, las reuniones de la junta 
y los comités afiliados, inciden sobre el rendimiento de los bancos. este 
artículo contribuye a una mejor comprensión del efecto de la gobernanza 
corporativa sobre el rendimiento económico de compañías financieras en 
tiempos de alta volatilidad del mercado de capitales. 
palabras claVe: gobernanza corporativa; rendimiento de los bancos; 
teoría de agencia; crisis económica. 
goVernança corporatiVa e desempenHo dos bancos de 
maior tamanHo da eUropa QUe Vão a público dUrante a 
crise econômica 
resUmo: este artigo se centra na relação entre a governança corpora-
tiva e o desempenho dos bancos de maior tamanho da europa que vão a 
público na bolsa, que é um tema menos estudado nos artigos sobre ren-
dimento. O estudo se baseia na teoria de agência e usamos uma amostra 
de 404 observações que se referem a 97 bancos selecionados do ranking 
anual de Forbes dentre as 2000 companhias mundiais de maior tamanho. 
Cobre o período de 2006 a 2010 e, portanto, examina as mudanças nos 
indicadores de rendimento dentro da recente crise econômica. Com base 
na análise de dados de painel, confirmamos que a variedade de fatores 
de governança, incluindo o tamanho da diretoria, a nomeação interna, a 
idade dos diretores, as reuniões da diretoria e os comitês afiliados, incidem 
sobre o rendimento dos bancos. este artigo contribui para uma melhor 
compreensão do efeito da governança corporativa sobre o rendimento 
econômico de companhias financeiras em tempos de alta volatilidade do 
mercado de capitais. 
palaVras-cHaVe: governança corporativa; rendimento dos bancos; 
teoria de agência; crise econômica. 
goUVernance corporatiVe et rendement des banQUes 
d’eUrope cotÉes d’Une taille importante  pendant la crise 
ÉconomiQUe
rÉsUmÉ : Cet article est centré sur la relation entre la gouvernance cor-
porative et le rendement des banques cotées en bourse et de grande taille 
d’Europe, ce qui est un sujet moins étudié dans les articles sur le rende-
ment. L’étude se base sur la théorie d’agence et nous utilisons un échan-
tillon de 404 observations qui se réfèrent à 97 banques choisies d’après le 
ranking annuel de Forbes des 2000 compagnies mondiales de plus grande 
taille. elle couvre la période de 2006 à 2010, et examine les changements 
dans les indicateurs de rendement au cours de la récente crise économique. 
Sur la base de l’analyse de données du panel, nous confirmons que la va-
riété des facteurs de gouvernance, incluant la taille du conseil d’entre-
prise, la nomination interne, l’âge des directeurs, les réunions du conseil 
d’entreprise et les comités affiliés ont une incidence sur le rendement des 
banques. Cet article contribue à une meilleure compréhension de l’effet de 
la gouvernance corporative sur le rendement économique de compagnies 
financières en des périodes de haute volatilité du marché des capitaux.
mots-clÉs : gouvernance corporative ; rendement des banques ; théorie 
d’agence ; crise économique.
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the importance of this work is justified by the focus on the 
period of the recent financial crisis and the small number 
of research studies that focus on the strategic perspec-
tive of the boards (adams & mehran, 2003; Kim, Burns & 
Prescott, 2009). Furthermore, it allows the identification of 
differences between north american and european banks, 
although we did not fully follow the factors proposed by 
Grove et al. (2011) as we gave preference to the ones pro-
posed by larcker et al. (2007). in this regard, Klein, sha-
piro and young (2005) state that there is no clear evidence 
that better corporate governance leads to better perfor-
mance of the companies in different markets.
the focus of this work is to understand the relationship 
between corporate governance mechanisms adopted by 
the major european listed banks and their performance. 
We verify the pattern in these relations in the time pe-
riod under analysis. this paper contributes to a better un-
derstanding of the effect of corporate governance on the 
financial performance of the financial companies, espe-
cially the type of mechanisms and the relationship with 
performance variables. Besides the evident negative influ-
ence of the debt ratios on bank performance in times of 
financial crisis, we were able to find significant bank per-
formance drivers among corporate governance indicators. 
the results demonstrate the significant positive influence 
of board meeting frequency and directors’ experience mea-
sured with the director’s age on the bank performance. The 
results did not provide the evidence to support the perfor-
mance effect of block ownership, anti-takeover provisions, 
Ceo duality, busy boards, compensation mix and insider 
power that demonstrate a significant performance effect 
in a stable economic situation according to previous re-
search. the bank size and the headquarters location (the 
Eurozone and countries’ GDP per capita) also influence the 
performance of european banks.
the article is structured as follows. We present the litera-
ture review and the hypotheses in the section 1. section 2 
provides the conceptual model, the variables and empirical 
agenda. the results and discussion are given in the sec-
tion 3. Finally, we summarize conclusions and recommen-
dations for future research in the section 4.
literature review and hypotheses
Corporate governance regards control mechanisms and the 
management of relationships between the various actors 
with effects on company performance. in this context, the 
board of directors, large shareholders and the market for 
corporate control stand out. Classic research studies the 
effect or the limitation of the behavior of executives and 
their action on performance (Core, Holthausen & larcker, 
1999; Klein, 2002). Black, Jang, Kim and mark (2002) ob-
served that companies with better corporate governance 
have better financial performance, which is supported by 
Jensen and meckling (1976) and Fama and Jensen (1983). 
Good corporate governance helps the owner to exert con-
trol over the company’s business. In turn, the governance 
mechanisms confer the owners a command position to 
manage the directors. 
traditionally, good corporate governance is associated 
with dispersed ownership, middle-sized independent board 
of directors and other mechanisms mitigating the agency 
costs. But the question of what good corporate gover-
nance is; is still open. How is it possible to quantify the 
quality of corporate governance? there are a large number 
of different approaches from using a large set of gover-
nance coefficients to developing the original research cor-
porate governance ratings (e.g. Gompers, ishii & metrick, 
2003). in this study, we use the methodology by larcker 
et al. (2007) to evaluate the influence of corporate gover-
nance mechanisms on the bank performance described in 
methodological section of the paper. Below, we present a 
number of hypotheses concerning different dimensions of 
corporate governance.
Grossman and Hart (1988) highlight the conflict between 
minority and majority shareholders, as these are encouraged 
to maximize corporate performance and discriminate the mi-
nority, which leads to increased agency costs (Barclay & Hol-
derness, 1989). Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi (1997) observe 
that the higher shareholder concentration leads to excessive 
control and the limitation of executives’ initiative. 
iannotta, nocera and sironi (2007); Bektas and Kaymak 
(2009) report that, in banks, the effect of shareholder con-
centration on performance is different. sarkar and sarkar 
(2000); Gorton and schmid (2000) observe that block 
ownership is positively related to performance, leading to 
higher market-to book ratios and return on assets. shleifer 
and vishny (1986) support that the concentrated owner-
ship improves performance through the increase in control, 
but demsetz and villalonga (2001) state that the influ-
ence is negative. the non-linear impact of ownership on 
firm performance is highlighted by Prowse (1990); Holder-
ness, Kroszner and sheehan (1999).
akhigbe and madura (1996) consider that in companies 
with a high level of insider holdings and a low level of insti-
tutional holdings the adoption of anti-takeover provisions 
has negative effects on long-term performance. accord-
ingly, larcker et al. (2007) found a negative association 
between anti-takeover provisions and performance and 
agrawal and Knoeber (1996) found that the higher control 
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of the company via takeovers has a negative effect on per-
formance. other results suggest that anti-takeover provi-
sions have a positive influence on operating performance 
(Beiner, drobetz, schmid & Zimmerman, 2006; seppo, Put-
tonen & Ratilainen, 2011). similarly, Bauer et al. (2004) 
found a positive relationship between operating perfor-
mance and the quality of external corporate governance.
larcker et al. (2007) consider that the presence of debt is 
negatively associated with operating performance. How-
ever, debt generates external monitoring and influences 
the controlling shareholders to improve company per-
formance. debt is based on the perspective of creditors 
acting as a mechanism of corporate governance encom-
passing the natural adjustment of the market with positive 
effects on performance (Klock et al., 2005; mansi, maxwell 
& miller, 2004). For denis (2001) and mcColgan (2001) 
these governance mechanisms are effective and positive 
through the reduction of agency costs and the increase in 
performance. We suppose the debt level may have both 
a negative and a positive influence on bank performance 
depending on the sector and the business environment. as 
this study is devoted to crisis environment we suppose the 
negative performance effect of debt.
Consequently, the following hypotheses were formulated:
Hypothesis 1: Block ownership has a negative influence on 
bank performance.
Hypothesis 2: anti-takeover provisions have a negative in-
fluence on bank performance.
Hypothesis 3: debt level has a negative influence on bank 
performance.
according to dalton, daily, Johnson and ellstrand (1999) 
larger boards accumulate more resources, expertise and 
negotiating power resulting from agency conflict (Jensen, 
1993), but the larger size affects the decision-making pro-
cess, making it more difficult and time consuming. adams 
and mehran (2003) observe that banks with larger boards 
have a complex organizational structure and require more 
committees (e.g., lending and credit risk committees). 
However, the smallest dimension of the board gives the 
Ceo more power (yermack, 1996). de andres and valle-
lado (2008); Grove et al. (2011) observed nonlinear rela-
tionships between the board size and bank performance, 
and the reasoning is that smaller boards make decisions 
faster, but large boards have greater experience, which 
is in accordance with Bennedsen, Kongsted and nielson 
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(2008) who argue that there is an ideal board size beyond 
which the company’s performance is impaired. Adams 
and mehran (2005) find a positive effect of board size on 
performance. this is because larger boards have more in-
formation (Coles, daniel & naveen, 2008; dalton et al., 
2005). Walsh and seward (1990); daily and dalton (1993) 
reported that larger boards contributed to better financial 
performance. in the opposite direction, eisenberg, sund-
gren and Wells (1998) showed that companies with smaller 
boards had higher Roa. Given such diversity, Beiner et al. 
(2006) affirm that these results are inconsistent. in this study, 
we work with the largest european banks. this leads us to the 
idea that the nonlinear relationship will result in a negative in-
fluence on bank performance for the sample banks.
the insider board members are an important source of spe-
cific information but can be influenced by the CEO’s lack 
of independence or by the distortion of objectives (Raheja, 
2005). in view of the conflict between owners and man-
agers, the managers that increase their ownership power 
tend to choose a board that is unlikely to be controlled 
by other shareholders (lasfer, 2006). thus, companies that 
have high managerial ownership are less likely to have a 
high proportion of non-executives on the board and to 
appoint a non-executive chairman. Helland and sykuta 
(2005) consider that in firms that are more geared towards 
performance control, when the conflict centers on the rela-
tionship between majority and minority shareholders, the 
shareholders resort to more insiders on the board to in-
crease the control.
the concentration of power is a key feature of insider 
power indicating weak corporate governance. It’s as-
sumed that the Ceo duality reduces the independence of 
the board (larcker et al., 2007; yermack, 1996). this sup-
ports the findings by Pi and timme (1993) indicating that 
in companies in the financial sector, the concentration of 
power has negative effects on Roa. However, the duality 
may bring about benefits, including the reduction of infor-
mation asymmetry, reducing agency costs and improves 
the operating performance of the company (Belkhir, 2004; 
Bhagat & Bolton, 2008). yet some studies find no signifi-
cant relationship between duality and firm performance 
(Coles, mcWilliams & sen, 2001; Rechner & dalton, 1991). 
thus, the following hypotheses were expressed:
Hypothesis 4: Board size has a negative influence on 
bank performance.
Hypothesis 5: insider representation has a negative influ-
ence on bank performance.
Hypothesis 6: Ceo duality has a negative influence on 
bank performance.
serfling (2012) argues that the age of the Ceo has a major 
effect on business performance and contributes to the ex-
istence of agency costs. an older Ceo may turn the knowl-
edge, skills and competencies that are obsolete and induce 
organizational decline (agarwal & Gort, 2002). But for Jain 
and Kini (1994); Fama and French (2004) age does not ex-
plain the decrease in performance.
Harris and shimizu (2004) found that busy directors are 
important sources of knowledge and improve the perfor-
mance. However, companies that resort to busy directors 
(serving on three or more boards) have lower market-to-
book ratios and weaker operating profitability (Ferris, Ja-
gannathan & Pritchard, 2003; Fich & shivadasani, 2004).
vafeas (1999) indicates that the frequency of board meet-
ings is negatively related to performance. For other au-
thors the highest frequency of board meetings results in 
higher quality of monitoring of management actions and 
reinforces bonds of cohesion between directors with pos-
itive impact on corporate performance (lipton & lorsch, 
1992; mangena & tauringana, 2008; ntim, 2009). the hy-
potheses are as follows:
Hypothesis 7: Directors’ age influence bank performance.
Hypothesis 8: Busy directors have a negative influence on 
bank performance.
Hypothesis 9: meeting frequency influences bank perfor-
mance positively.
Baysinger and Butler (1985) found that firms that perform 
better include more outsiders on the board. in turn, Klein 
(2002) verified the presence of lower abnormal accruals 
when the board has a majority of outside directors. Given 
the large size of the boards in banks, adams and mehran 
(2003) refer to the need to pressure the boards to achieve 
greater efficiency in order to meet operational objectives. 
according to Boone, Field, Karpoff and Raheja (2007) and 
linck, netter and yang (2008) in companies with larger 
boards there is a propensity for a progressive degeneration 
of corporate governance quality and higher Ceo compen-
sation. a larger percentage of affiliated or inside directors 
in the audit committee is associated with lower efficacy of 
the committee and a lower quality of earnings in terms of 
more discretionary accruals (Klein, 2002; vafeas, 2005).
traditional opinion points to executive stock options 
having positive effects on firm performance, aligning the 
interest of executives with the interests of the shareholders 
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(e.g. Hanlon, Rajgopal & shevlin, 2003). the stock options 
lead the executives to focus on the short-term stock price 
to obtain better compensation when this is how they are 
remunerated (Peng & Roell, 2008). according to Chen, 
Firth, Gao and Rui (2006) the executive compensation 
through stock options is more prevalent in banks than 
other industries and this leads to high-risk taking in the 
banking industry. ang, Cole and lin (2000) found that 
bank Ceos receive more and have greater incentives re-
sulting from their compensation structure than Ceos of 
non-banking companies. However, Core et al. (1999); Brick, 
Palmon and Wald (2006) report that excessive Ceo com-
pensation has a negative impact on the operating perfor-
mance of companies. newman and mozes (1999) found 
that Ceos receive preferential treatment, at the expense of 
shareholders, when insiders are members of the compen-
sation committee. However, some studies demonstrate no 
link between stock compensation plans and performance 
(e.g. vafeas, 1999). in consequence, the hypotheses are 
the following:
Hypothesis 10: affiliated committees have a negative in-
fluence on bank performance.
Hypothesis 11: the compensation mix has a positive influ-
ence on bank performance.
the impact of board size on performance depends on the 
characteristics of the company and the country where it 
operates because the role and function of the board varies 
between countries. the performance of the large compa-
nies will depend on the specific functions and effectiveness 
of boards and this will differ according to the institutional 
and legal environment (e.g., Guest, 2008). For Klapper and 
love (2004), a firm-level corporate governance is highly 
correlated with better operating performance measured by 
Roa. Kiel and nicholson (2003) found positive correlation 
between firm size and performance. It’s assumed that the 
development of the countries where banks undertake their 
banking business affects their performance. likewise, the 
location of the headquarters in the eurozone has effects 
on financing options and performance. the following hy-
potheses were formulated:
Hypothesis 12: Bank size influences the bank performance.
Hypothesis 13: the bank headquarters location (eurozone 
and countries’ GDP per capita) influences bank performance.
conceptual model, Variables 
and empirical agenda
the conceptual model
the model relates the corporate governance factors with 
the bank performance variables (Figure 1). the size of the 
banks and the banks’ headquarters location are consid-
ered as control variables.
FigUre 1. conceptual model and Hypotheses
Bank size   H12 
Headquarters location H13 
H11
H10 
H9
H8
H7
H6
H5
H3 
H4
H1
H2
Debt
Busy directors
Meetings frequency
Board size
Insider representation
CEO duality
Compensation mix
Affiliated committees
Block ownership
Anti -takeover
Performance
Directors’ age
Source: Authors’ own.
Factors and Variables
in this study, based on larcker et al. (2007), we used a 
total of 36 corporate governance variables that resulted 
in 13 factors (Table 1). We didn’t replicate the factor Ac-
tive that included three variables related to the activism 
of institutional investors. in the case of remuneration, it 
wasn’t possible to replicate the original variables that were 
replaced by two others focusing on the alignment of inter-
ests between ownership and management.
the performance variables are the return on assets (Roa), 
expressing performance in the accounting perspective, the 
book to market ratio (Btm), which reflects the market valu-
ation, and the net interest margin (nim), which evaluates 
the specific performance arising from banking activity. 
the control variables are the size of the bank (C_size), the 
bank’s headquarters in a Eurozone country (C_Eurozone), 
and GdP per capita (C_GdPperCapita), to reflect the dif-
ferent levels of economic development of each country.
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table 1. detailed information about the Variables
Factor Variable description detail
C
or
po
ra
te
 G
ov
er
na
nc
e
F_Block P_Blockown Percentage of shares held by blockholders the shareholdings above 5% of the shares are considered 
blockholdings and this variable corresponds to the sum of 
all blockholdings
n_Block number of blockholders number of shareholders with shareholdings above 5%
P_largest Percentage of shares held by the largest 
shareholder
it was assumed that the largest shareholder can be institu-
tional or an individual, which is characteristic in some eu-
ropean countries, in particular in listed companies held by 
families
F_anti-takeoveri PoisonPill the bank has a poison pill provision dummy variable assuming the value 1 when there is poison 
pill and 0 when there isn’t such a provision
P_affiliatedown Percentage of shares held by affiliated 
directors
We considered the affiliated definition presented by larcker 
et al. (2007, p. 971): ‘any outside director who is a former ex-
ecutive mentioned or who is mentioned in the “certain trans-
actions” section’
staggeredBoard existence of a staggered board Dummy variable equal to 1 when the board members’ man-
date term differs among them and 0 if all mandate term are 
equal
F_anti-takeoverii supermajority there is a supermajority limitation for 
takeovers
dummy variable equal to 1 if there is a supermajority limita-
tion and 0 if there isn’t
stateincorporated the country regulation limits takeovers according to Clerc et al. (2012), the countries where the take-
over costs are higher are identified with 1 and the others 
with 0
F_debt debttomarket debt to market Ratio It’s ratio of the accounting value of debt over the market 
value of the bank
Preferredtomarket Rácio Preffered to market It’s ratio of the accounting value preferred equity over the 
market value of the bank
F_Boardsize CCsize size of the compensation committee number of directors
aCsize size of the audit committee
Bdsize size of the board of directors
F_insiderapp P_affiliatedapp Percentage of affiliated directors appointed 
by insiders
If there aren’t directors with these characteristics, the vari-
able equals 0
P_outsiderapp Percentage of outsider directors appointed 
by insiders
F_insidPower P_exown(extop) average percentage of shares held by exec-
utive directors (except Ceo)
P_topexecown Percentage of shares held by the Ceo
P_Boardinside Percentage of insiders on the board of 
directors
Unequalvoting differences in the voting rights dummy variable equal to 1 if there are unequal voting rights
F_Ceoduality leaddirector there is a lead director dummy variable equal to 1 if true. We opted to refer, as 
Grove et al. (2011) to this factor as CeodualityinsiderChairman the Ceo is the chairman of the board
F_directorsage P_oldoutsiders Percentage of outsiders older than 70 year
P_oldaffiliated Percentage of affiliated older than 70 year
P_oldinsiders Percentage of insiders older than 70 year
F_Busydirectors P_Busyoutsiders Percentage of outside directors considered 
busy
We have considered, accordingly to larcker et al. (2007), that 
someone that belongs to four or more boards is busy
P_Busyaffiliated Percentage of affiliated directors consid-
ered busy
P_Busyinsiders Percentage of insider directors considered 
busy
F_meetings n_aCmeetings number of meetings held by the audit 
committee
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table 1. detailed information about the Variables (continued)
Factor Variable description detail
C
or
po
ra
te
 G
ov
er
na
nc
e
n_CCmeetings number of meetings held by the compensa-
tion committee
n_Boardmeetings number of meetings held by the board of 
directors
F_affiliated P_aCaffiliated Percentage of affiliated directors in the 
audit committee
P_CCaffiliated Percentage of affiliated directors in the 
compensation committee
aCChairaffiliated audit committee chairman affiliated dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the chairman is affiliated 
and 0 otherwise CCChairaffiliated Compensation committee chairman 
affiliated
F_Compmix linktotsR is the Ceo compensation linked to the total 
shareholder return
datastream dummy variable equal to 1 when the Ceo com-
pensation is linked to total shareholder return (tsR)
Remstructure Is the executive directors’ compensation is 
composed of fixed remuneration, bonus and 
stock options plans
Datastream dummy variable equal to 1 when the directors’ 
compensation is composed of fixed remuneration, bonus and 
stock options plans
C
on
tr
ol
C_size size of the bank Calculated as ln of assets
C_eurozone Headquarters in a eurozone country Dummy variable equal to 1 when the banks’ headquarters is 
located in a eurozone country
C_GdPperCapita GdP per capita in the country where the 
bank has its headquarters
ln of values obtained from eurostat and Worldbank 
(liechenstein)
Pe
rf
or
m
an
ce Roa Return on assets operating income over the average of total assets
Btm Book to market Ratio Book value of equity over market value
nim net interest margin total interest income minus total interest expense over the 
average of total assets
Source: Authors’ own.
statistical instruments
in this research, we followed the approach of larcker et 
al. (2007) and Grove et al. (2011) (that focused on north 
american banks), consisting in the creation of governance 
factors from the original variables. We standardized the 
36 governance variables and, based on the average of the 
standardized variables, the governance index scores were 
computed. the procedure was adjusted to reflect the sub-
stitutability of variables, such as larcker et al. (2007), in 
the factors anti-takeover i, compensation mix and Ceo 
duality. Using this methodology, we computed 13 gover-
nance factors.
the panel data analysis method was considered suitable 
to study the temporal structure of the data (e.g., mangena, 
tauringana & Chamisa, 2012). since some of the banks do 
not appear on the list every year, we have an unbalanced 
panel whose technical details are presented by Wooldridge 
(2002). the random effects model is:
Yit = bXit + a + uit + eit [1]
where uit is the between entity error and eit is the within 
entity error.
sample and data collection
For the present study, we selected banks with headquar-
ters in european countries that are part of the list of the 
2,000 largest listed companies “Global 2000” published 
by Forbes. We considered the years 2006 to 2010. ac-
cording to the methodology (Forbes, 2011), the classifica-
tion of companies in the “Global 2000” list was based on 
sales, profits, assets and stock market valuation collected 
through the databases interactive data, thomson Reuters 
Fundamentals and Worldscope. the sample consists of 
404 observations of 97 different banks. From these banks, 
70 appear in the ranking in each year, four banks appear 
only in four years, three banks appear in three years, nine 
banks in two years and, finally, 11 banks only have one 
presence in the ranking. detailed information on the distri-
bution by year and country is presented in table 2.
Governance variables were mostly hand-collected from the 
banks’ annual reports -obtained on their websites- and the 
variables of a financial nature and remuneration were ob-
tained through the datastream database.
90 rev.  innovar vol.  24,  núm. 53,  Julio-septiembre de 2014
INBAM  2013
table 2. number of banks in each country and year
country 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
austria 4 4 4 4 4
Belgium 3 3 3 3 3
denmark 3 3 3 3 3
Finland 1 1 1 1 1
France 5 5 5 5 5
Germany 5 4 5 7 6
Greece 7 7 7 7 7
Hungary 1 1 1 1 1
iceland 3 3 0 0 0
ireland 3 3 2 2 2
italy 15 11 12 11 11
liechtenstein 0 0 1 1 1
luxembourg 1 1 1 1 1
netherlands 2 1 1 1 1
norway 0 1 0 1 1
Poland 1 1 1 1 1
Portugal 2 2 2 2 3
spain 7 7 8 8 8
sweden 4 4 4 4 4
switzerland 6 4 6 8 7
turkey 4 5 5 5 5
United Kingdom 10 8 5 5 5
nr. european Banks 87 79 77 81 80
total market value 
(european Banks)
1,653 
m €
1,303 
m €
490 
m €
929 
m €
939 
m €
nr. Banks in Forbes “Global 2000” 304 315 307 308 306
total market value (all Banks in 
“Global 2000”)
4,241 
m €
3,663 
m €
1,646 
m €
3,147 
m €
3,885 
m €
source: Forbes “Global 2000”, years 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010. 
to interpret the results, we took into consideration the 
value of R2 (coefficient of determination) for prediction ac-
curacy, this case presented for overall, between and within. 
to assess the significance of each regression, we considered 
the value of the Wald chi2, testing whether the regression 
coefficients are nonzero. in the analysis of individual coef-
ficients, we refer to the p-value. the coefficients simultane-
ously include the within and between effects, representing 
the average of the independent variable effect on the de-
pendent variable when the dependent variable varies one 
temporal unit and between banks.
analysis and results
descriptive analysis
the average values and standard deviations of the vari-
ables in each year and the evolution of european banks in 
the 5-year period are presented in table 3.
an important feature distinguishing the european and U.s. 
banks is the level of shareholder dispersion (although the 
sample includes the largest UK banks that are more sim-
ilar to their U.s. counterparts). analyzing the percentage 
held by the main shareholder, slightly above 20%, it can 
be assumed that it allows the effective control of the bank, 
which is also supported by the average number of block-
holders close to 1.7 and the accumulated percentage held 
by them is slightly below 30%. the existence of more than 
20% of banks with unequal voting rights accentuates the 
power of dominant shareholders. in this context, we rec-
ognize the importance of the problem of expropriation of 
minority shareholders, accordingly to the agency theory. 
Referring to 2005, Grove et al. (2011) show that the per-
centage held by the largest shareholder is only 11%, and 
blockholders only own 17% of the shares. the Ceo has a 
higher percentage of shares than the average executive 
but it remains below 1%, which is significantly lower than 
the value of 3.3% presented by larcker et al. (2007).
Referring to the board of directors organization, on av-
erage, the board has more than 13 members, while the 
compensation committee consists of less than 4 members 
and the audit committee has more than 4 members. the 
boards meet on a monthly basis, but there is an increase 
in frequency over the 5-year period. although meeting 
less frequently, audit and compensation committees show 
greater activity in the post-crisis period. the board is made 
up of about 30% insiders (Grove et al. refer 16% in 2011) 
that is quite stable across the period. Besides, the number 
of banks with an insider chairman and a lead director is in-
creasing in times of crisis providing us with the evidence of 
the growing level of Ceo duality.
in the crisis period, we find the substantial decrease in the 
percentage of busy managers, specially the outsiders, which 
is important when undertaking monitoring activities. the 
percentage of companies that pay executives using various 
components (distinct deadlines and dependent on the evo-
lution of the company) increased from 78.16% to 90% from 
pre-crisis 2006 to post-crisis 2010. the percentage of banks 
that index the Ceo compensation to total shareholder re-
turn also increased and fixed at 22.5% in 2010.
the anti-takeover defense poison pill is adopted in more 
than 20% of the banks and the supermajority require-
ments in about 95% of the banks, and both increased 
in the crisis period. the progressive adoption in different 
countries of the eU regulation on takeovers, as pointed by 
Clerc, demarigny, valiante and aremendía (2012), led to 
an increase in the takeover costs. 
through the years, there was an increase in the average 
size of banks. nevertheless the crisis resulted in the strong
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table 3. descriptive statistics
Variable
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
mean/
Freq.
st. dev.
mean/
Freq.
st. dev.
mean/
Freq.
st. dev.
mean/
Freq.
st. dev.
mean/
Freq.
st. dev.
C
or
po
ra
te
 G
ov
er
na
nc
e
P_Blockown 28.86 27.32 28.29 26.15 29.35 27.80 29.31 28.07 29.19 28.75
n_Block 1.66 3.27 1.70 3.06 1.71 3.12 1.74 3.07 1.74 3.09
P_largest 19.70 22.71 21.06 22.11 22.28 23.97 21.97 24.23 21.65 24.40
P_aCaffiliated 4.25 11.55 4.31 11.10 4.77 12.16 5.59 13.93 4.83 12.65
P_CCaffiliated 5.68 16.59 7.31 18.91 3.97 11.84 5.95 16.72 4.39 12.29
aCChairaffiliated 3.45 ---- 3.80 ---- 3.90 ---- 4.94 ---- 5.00 ----
CCChairaffiliated 5.75 ---- 3.80 ---- 1.30 ---- 3.70 ---- 3.75 ----
P_affiliatedapp 9.33 25.03 9.51 25.46 8.57 23.65 7.12 21.22 7.17 21.16
P_outsiderapp 3.14 9.39 3.72 9.54 4.85 11.06 4.60 10.19 5.64 13.00
PoisonPill 19.54 ---- 22.78 ---- 23.38 ---- 23.46 ---- 22.50 ----
P_affiliatedown 2.21 5.34 2.25 5.59 2.31 5.71 3.03 8.12 2.40 5.76
staggeredBoard 74.71 ---- 72.15 ---- 76.62 ---- 79.01 ---- 78.75 ----
P_oldoutsiders 2.93 9.89 3.16 9.40 3.17 8.61 2.70 7.33 2.59 6.78
P_oldaffiliated 0.97 5.96 1.05 6.25 1.08 6.33 1.03 6.17 1.04 6.21
P_oldinsiders 0.55 2.62 0.59 2.75 0.64 3.01 0.61 2.94 0.62 2.96
debttomarket 5.15 5.48 7.59 11.51 28.68 67.40 14.13 20.32 15.74 27.67
Preferredtomarket 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.07 0.05 0.33 0.04 0.11 0.06 0.16
P_exown(extop) 0.99 2.32 0.87 2.27 0.88 2.30 0.88 2.29 0.89 2.31
P_topexecown 0.36 0.52 0.31 0.50 0.32 0.50 0.38 0.76 0.32 0.50
P_Boardinside 29.61 19.33 29.00 19.25 29.42 19.64 28.02 20.25 28.25 21.28
Unequalvoting 22.99 ---- 21.52 ---- 22.08 ---- 20.99 ---- 21.25 ----
linktotsR 19.54 ---- 24.05 ---- 22.08 ---- 20.99 ---- 22.50 ----
Remstructure 78.16 ---- 87.34 ---- 85.71 ---- 90.12 ---- 90.00 ----
n_aCmeetings 6.59 3.15 6.72 3.18 7.04 3.63 7.25 3.91 7.19 4.48
n_CCmeetings 4.69 2.39 4.65 2.20 4.94 2.26 5.31 2.99 5.20 2.82
n_Boardmeetings 11.25 5.53 11.80 7.08 12.68 7.13 12.40 6.99 12.26 7.85
leaddirector 16.09 ---- 17.72 ---- 18.18 ---- 18.52 ---- 18.75 ----
insiderChairman 16.09 ---- 17.72 ---- 18.18 ---- 17.28 ---- 17.50 ----
CCsize 3.80 1.37 3.92 1.25 3.75 1.26 3.83 1.26 3.70 1.33
aCsize 4.39 1.76 4.56 1.82 4.45 1.91 4.35 1.76 4.28 1.90
Bdsize 13.47 4.72 13.66 4.77 13.56 4.98 13.30 4.97 13.35 5.15
supermajority 86.21 ---- 87.34 ---- 94.81 ---- 95.06 ---- 95.00 ----
stateincorporated 54.02 ---- 83.54 ---- 85.71 ---- 93.83 ---- 93.75 ----
P_Busyoutsiders 43.23 26.04 41.31 25.93 39.96 25.82 36.96 25.44 34.54 25.24
P_Busyaffiliated 21.91 34.74 17.83 30.33 19.38 33.08 18.46 32.80 19.95 33.66
P_Busyinsiders 47.03 35.85 46.21 36.77 46.92 37.09 45.23 37.20 44.87 37.83
C
on
tr
ol size (million €) 224 364 276 475 293 524 290 477 305 503
C_eurozone 63.22 ---- 62.03 ---- 66.23 ---- 64.20 ---- 65.00 ----
GdPperCapita (th €) 28.2 10.3 28.6 11.5 28.3 13.6 27.7 13.0 27.9 13.8
Pe
rf
or
m
an
ce Roa 0.013 0.007 0.012 0.008 0.007 0.008 0.006 0.010 0.006 0.010
Btm 0.512 0.388 0.682 0.447 2.721 5.534 1.685 2.225 1.768 2.035
nim 0.016 0.011 0.016 0.010 0.016 0.009 0.015 0.008 0.014 0.008
Note: Values presented in percentage, count, and thousand or million Euros, according to the specificity of each variable. The ratios aren’t presented as percentages.
Source: Authors’ own.
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devaluation of banks in the markets (reported in table 2) 
with obvious impact on debt-to-market and preferred-to-
market ratios. 
the data highlights the importance of GdP per capita to 
reflect the different levels of development of the european 
countries. the average, weighted by the number of banks 
in each country, is € 28,000/year and decreasing in recent 
years, ranging from € 6,300 or € 8,000 in turkey or Poland 
and € 52,000 in norway or even higher in liechtenstein.
there is a decrease in the performance of european banks, 
with Roa falling by half in three years, lower than that 
Grove et al. (2011) obtained for banks in Usa. the book-to-
market ratio is also affected by the sharp decline of stock 
market valuation. the smallest difference between the be-
ginning and end of the period corresponds to the variable 
nim that reduces from 0.016 in 2006 to 0.014 in 2010.
the Pearson correlations (table 4), for the year 2008, display 
positive correlations between F_debt and F_Compmix, be-
tween F_debt and F_Boardsize and between F_Compmix 
and F_anti-takeoverii. the F_Busydirectors factor is posi-
tively correlated with factors F_affiliated, F_directorsage, 
F_Compmix, F_Boardsize and F_anti-takeoverii.
table 4. pearson correlations (year 2008)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
1. F_Block 1
2. F_anti-takeoveri
0.06
(0.59)
1
3. 
F_anti-takeoverii
0.01
(0.96)
-0.05
(0.66)
1
4. F_debt
-0.13
(0.25)
0.14
(0.23)
0.14
(0.23)
1
5. F_Boardsize
-0.18
(0.12)
-0.19
(0.10)
0.19
(0.10)
0.28
(0.01)
1
6. F_insiderapp
-0.17
(0.15)
0.01
(0.96)
-0.10
(0.38)
-0.00
(0.97)
0.06
(0.62)
1
7. F_insidPower
-0.10
(0.40)
-0.15
(0.20)
-0.06
(0.61)
-0.04
(0.74)
0.18
(0.12)
0.13
(0.26)
1
8. F_Ceoduality
0.09
(0.44)
0.12
(0.29)
0.00
(1.00)
-0.01
(0.92)
0.17
(0.15)
0.10
(0.37)
-0.16
(0.18)
1
9. F_directorsage
0.07
(0.54)
-0.14
(0.24)
0.12
(0.28)
0.11
(0.32)
0.18
(0.12)
-0.12
(0.32)
0.03
(0.80)
0.00
(0.99)
1
10. 
F_Busydirectors
0.01
(0.93)
0.02
(0.87)
0.23
(0.04)
-0.02
(0.85)
0.22
(0.05)
-0.01
(0.95)
0.15
(0.19)
0.19
(0.10)
0.24
(0.03)
1
11. F_meetings
0.03
(0.77)
0.06
(0.61)
-0.05
(0.68)
-0.05
(0.65)
0.20
(0.08)
0.04
(0.72)
0.15
(0.20)
0.08
(0.51)
-0.19
(0.09)
0.07
(0.54)
1
12. F_affiliated
-0.07
(0.55)
-0.19
(0.11)
0.13
(0.27)
-0.09
(0.45)
0.13
(0.25)
-0.02
(0.88)
0.05
(0.69)
0.00
(1.00)
0.05
(0.70)
0.26
(0.02)
0.07
(0.53)
1
13. F_Compmix
0.04
(0.73)
0.15
(0.20)
0.40
(0.00)
0.28
(0.01)
0.21
(0.06)
-0.12
(0.31)
-0.05
(0.68)
0.12
(0.28)
0.13
(0.27)
0.24
(0.04)
-0.07
(0.57)
0.15
(0.18)
1
14. C_size
-0.09
(0.43)
0.20
(0.09)
0.31
(0.01)
0.15
(0.19)
0.41
(0.00)
-0.07
(0.54)
0.04
(0.70)
0.07
(0.57)
0.09
(0.42)
0.36
(0.00)
0.16
(0.16)
0.21
(0.07)
0.52
(0.00)
1
15. C_eurozone
-0.03
(0.80)
-0.31
(0.01)
0.30
(0.01)
0.19
(0.11)
0.30
(0.01)
-0.00
(1.00)
0.10
(0.39)
-0.17
(0.14)
0.10
(0.37)
0.10
(0.41)
-0.06
(0.62)
-0.10
(0.41)
0.11
(0.33)
0.08
(0.49)
1
16. 
C_GdPperCapita
-0.15
(0.21)
0.05
(0.64)
0.27
(0.02)
0.19
(0.09)
0.08
(0.51)
0.14
(0.22)
-0.12
(0.28)
0.03
(0.82)
0.18
(0.12)
0.15
(0.19)
-0.33
(0.00)
0.06
(0.61)
0.48
(0.00)
0.13
(0.26)
0.04
(0.74)
1
17. Roa
0.17
(0.13)
0.16
(0.16)
-0.31
(0.01)
-0.10
(0.39)
-0.26
(0.02)
-0.16
(0.18)
0.00
(0.97)
0.07
(0.52)
-0.10
(0.40)
-0.24
(0.04)
0.27
(0.02)
-0.06
(0.60)
-0.40
(0.00)
-0.36
(0.00)
-0.42
(0.00)
-0.58
(0.00)
1
18. Btm
-0.15
(0.18)
0.11
(0.36)
0.11
(0.35)
0.88
(0.00)
0.33
(0.00)
-0.01
(0.93)
0.00
(0.97)
0.01
(0.93)
-0.08
(0.48)
-0.06
(0.59)
-0.03
(0.80)
-0.09
(0.45)
0.23
(0.04)
0.15
(0.20)
0.16
(0.16)
0.13
(0.25)
-0.06
(0.60)
1
19. nim
0.09
(0.44)
-0.18
(0.13)
-0.09
(0.44)
0.03
(0.80)
0.16
(0.18)
-0.10
(0.40)
0.24
(0.04)
-0.07
(0.56)
-0.10
(0.40)
-0.21
(0.07)
0.23
(0.04)
-0.07
(0.54)
-0.03
(0.77)
-0.19
(0.10)
0.47
(0.00)
-0.30
(0.01)
0.21
(0.07)
0.02
(0.84)
1
Source: Authors’ own.
j o u r n a l
r e v i s t a
innovar
93rev.  innovar vol.  24,  núm. 53,  Julio-septiembre 2014
the control variable C_size is positively correlated with 
F_Compmix, F_Boardsize, F_anti-takeoverii and F_Busy-
directors. the control variable C_eurozone shows positive 
correlation with F_anti-takeoveri, F_Boardsize and F_anti-
takeoverii. the control variable C_GdPperCapita is posi-
tively correlated with F_Compmix and F_anti-takeoverii 
and negatively correlated with F_meetings.
the performance variable Roa shows a positive correlation 
with F_meetings and negative with F_Compmix, F_Board-
size, F_anti-takeoverii, F_Busydirectors, C_size, C_euro-
zone and C_GdPperCapita. it appears that smaller banks 
with their headquarters outside the eurozone and in less 
developed countries have better return on assets. different 
governance problems are more relevant in different con-
texts, influenced by the lower maturity of financial mar-
kets, lower shareholder protection and differences in the 
legal framework that increases the risk associated with 
investments.
the crisis particularly affects the performance variable 
Btm that is positively correlated with F_debt, F_Compmix 
and F_Boardsize. the performance variable nim is posi-
tively correlated with F_insidPower, F_meetings and C_eu-
rozone and negatively correlated with C_GdPperCapita.
multivariate analysis 
the panel data summary for each variable over the period, 
based on standard deviations, shows that the variation 
between banks (between) is stronger than the variation 
within the banks (within). the variable Btm is the only one 
whereby the within standard deviation exceeds the be-
tween standard deviation.
the random effects model is significant, despite fluctu-
ations in the explained variability (between) of the vari-
ables Roa (R2 = 0.651), Btm (R2 = 0.397) and nim (R2 = 
0.257) (table 5). the Wald statistics is quite high in all the 
specifications.
the factor F_Block, referring to blockholdings, shows no 
significant relationship with the performance, although it 
could be expected that greater shareholder concentration 
would imply better performance through the reduction of 
the collective action problem, thus not confirming hypoth-
esis 1. although the literature presents anti-takeover mea-
sures as an indicator of bad governance, this study did not 
find statistical evidence of this relationship; therefore, hy-
pothesis 2 isn’t supported.
the F_debt factor influences the performance with sta-
tistically significant relationships with the dependent 
variables, supporting hypothesis 3. the variable F_debt 
presents a negative relationship with Roa and nim and 
positive relationship with Btm. the higher debt contrib-
utes to lower the banks’ return on assets (ROA), lower prof-
itability margins (nim) and lower valuation of banks in the 
market, leading to a higher ratio Btm. 
table 5. random-effects gls regressions
dependent
Variables
indep. Variables
roa btm nim
F_Block
0.0005
(0.0006)
0.0516
(0.1935)
0.0003
(0.0009)
F_anti-takeoveri
0.0011
(0.0008)
-0.0564
(0.2535)
0.0005
(0.0007)
F_anti-takeoverii
-0.0006
(0.0006)
0.2056
(0.2212)
-0.0001
(0.0004)
F_debt
-0.0026***
(0.0005)
2.2065***
(0.1836)
-0.0007*
(0.0003)
F_Boardsize
0.0007
(0.0008)
0.5690*
(0.2415)
0.0012
(0.0007)
F_insiderapp
-0.0014*
(0.0006)
-0.1427
(0.2065)
-0.0002
(0.0006)
F_insidPower
0.0003
(0.0009)
0.4099
(0.2789)
0.0014
(0.0011)
F_Ceoduality
0.0017
(0.0025)
0.4586
(0.7981)
0.0000
(0.0020)
F_directorsage
0.0019**
(0.0007)
-0.9122***
(0.2085)
-0.0001
(0.0009)
F_Busydirectors
-0.0009
(0.0007)
0.0104
(0.2116)
-0.0004
(0.0006)
F_meetings
0.0013*
(0.0006)
-0.2732
(0.2049)
0.0004
(0.0005)
F_affiliated
-0.0004
(0.0007)
-0.2672
(0.2130)
0.0016**
(0.0006)
F_Compmix
-0.0005
(0.0007)
-0.0638
(0.2402)
0.0007
(0.0005)
C_size
-0.0017***
(0.0004)
0.0949
(0.1326)
-0.0021***
(0.0006)
C_eurozone
-0.0060***
(0.0011)
0.1556
(0.3436)
0.0068***
(0.0019)
C_GdPperCapita
-0.0058***
(0.0012)
-0.1599
(0.3580)
-0.0034*
(0.0018)
Constant
0.1027***
(0.0149)
1.2091
(4.5815)
0.0841***
(0.0207)
number of 
observations
404 404 404
Wald chi2(16) 181.39 182.95 49.45
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
R2 within 0.0810 0.2639 0.0582
R2 between 0.6505 0.3966 0.2565
R2 overall 0.4991 0.3611 0.2857
Rho (fraction of 
variance due to ui)
0.3285 0.1358 0.8831
(*), (**) and (***) indicate significance at levels 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 (2-tailed). the standard 
errors are presented in parentheses below the regression coefficients.
Source: Authors’ own.
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the factor concerning board and committee size (F_Board-
size), positively influences Btm, supporting the arguments 
that highlight that the excessive board size reduces its ca-
pacity to act, confirming hypothesis 4.
only one of the factors relating to insider representation 
presents statistically significant results, with F_insiderapp 
negatively influencing the return on assets (Roa), sup-
porting hypothesis 5. Factor F_insidPower emphasizes 
the gap in the relationship between ownership and man-
agement through the entrenchment of executives, but 
the results do not support the influence of this factor on 
performance.
still within the framework of the constitution and func-
tioning of the board, there is a statistically significant ef-
fect of the age of the directors (F_directorsage) in the 
performance of banks, confirming hypothesis 7. it appears 
that the higher age of directors, leveraging their knowl-
edge and experience, positively influences banks’ profit-
ability (Roa) and market valuation (negative relationship 
with the variable Btm).
there are no statistically significant relationships of the 
duality of the Ceo (F_Ceoduality) and busy directors (F_
Busydirectors) with performance, thus hypotheses 6 and 8 
aren’t confirmed.
the increased frequency of the board and its committee 
meetings presents statistically significant and positive in-
fluence on Roa, confirming hypothesis 9.
the preponderance of affiliated members on the board 
committees and chairs reduces the monitoring capacity of 
those committees. it would be expected or the F_affiliated 
factor to contribute negatively to performance. However, 
the results show a positive and statistically significant in-
fluence on nim indicating that the greater presence of 
affiliated members helps to increase the interest rate dif-
ferential on assets ratio (hypothesis 10).
although in the year 2008 the data reveals correlation be-
tween compensation mix and performance variables, none 
of the regressions confirm the existence of such influence 
relationship, giving no support for hypothesis 11.
Bank size (C_Size), the context in which the banks’ head-
quarters are located (C_eurozone), and the GdP per capita 
of the countries (C_GdPperCapita) show a statistically sig-
nificant relationship with performance measured by Roa 
and nim, confirming hypotheses 12 and 13. Bank size neg-
atively influences Roa and nim. the location in the euro 
zone contributes to a decrease in Roa but increases the 
business margins referred to the nim. the higher develop-
ment of the countries where the banks have headquarters, 
measured by GdP per capita, negatively influences the 
performance measured by Roa and nim.
discussion
the higher shareholder concentration observed in euro-
pean banks supports further studies on its impact on the 
functioning of the banks, particularly given the potential 
effect of expropriation of minority shareholders. the re-
sults obtained do not support the existence of a linear re-
lationship of shareholder concentration with performance 
or linear correlation with any other variable in the model. 
these results are coherent with the diversity of effects 
observed by iannotta et al. (2007); Kaymak and Bektas 
(2009), as in this case there is no significant relationship.
a number of papers emphasized the importance of non-
executive and independent directors as an indication of 
good corporate governance. However, we should also take 
into consideration the specific knowledge that insiders or 
affiliated directors have on the business or the company, 
contributing to higher business performance, which is sup-
ported in this study. in this vein of experience and knowl-
edge appreciation, we highlight the positive contribution 
of the old and affiliated directors on the performance of 
european banks. in this study, we do not demonstrate that 
the adoption of anti-takeover provisions is reflected in the 
performance of organizations, which contradicts the nega-
tive influence according to Beiner et al. (2006); seppo et 
al. (2011).
Financing the activities through the market (F_debt) leads 
banks to greater recognition in the market, thus, facili-
tating access to the market. However, this affects bank 
profitability (Roa) and consequently the profitability 
margin (NIM) due to the need to offer the banks’ clients 
better conditions to attract more unfavorable capital to 
the bank, according to the literature (mansi et al. 2004; 
Klock, mansi & maxwell, 2005). to our mind, it is worth 
mentioning that the financial leverage negatively influ-
ences not only the market performance of the bank mea-
sured with book-to-market ratio, but also the operational 
performance measures like the profitability margin. the 
key logic here concerns the crisis period. a number of pa-
pers describe the results demonstrating the negative in-
fluence of financial leverage on the performance of the 
companies in times of crisis (see e.g. davydov & vähämaa, 
2013), while during the stable financial periods, the market 
usually estimates the growing level of debt positively be-
cause of the increasing debt tax shield.
the larger boards (F_Boardsize) leverage the greater 
knowledge and experience of its members and the action 
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of independent members but, in our sample, this contrib-
utes to depreciation on the stock market (Btm). although 
the literature observes inconsistent results (e.g., Beiner et 
al., 2003), this study confirms the negative effect of the 
size of the board on the market valuation of bank assets 
that is traditionally supported with long and inefficient de-
cision-making processes involving extremely large boards.
the existence of a larger number of members appointed 
by insiders (F_insiderapp) has a negative effect on Roa. 
the older managers contribute positively to Roa and 
have a negative effect on Btm, reflecting the recognition 
and appreciation of the bank in the market, accordingly 
to serfling (2012) that observes the important effect of 
age on the performance of managers. these results dem-
onstrate the important role of the experience of managers 
in achieving results.
the board and the frequency of its committee meetings to 
analyze transactions and prepare the decision-making pro-
cess, positively influences Roa and, in the analysis period, 
the increase in the frequency of meetings is noticeable. 
these results confirm many authors (lipton & lorsch, 1992; 
mangena & tauringana, 2008; ntim, 2009) and contradict 
vafeas (1999). in turn, the affiliated committees influence 
an increase in the banks’ business margins (NIM). Authors 
such as Klein (2002) and vafeas (2005) show divergent re-
sults, suggesting the need for further studies.
the research model assumes that the influence of the con-
trol variables is directly reflected in the performance of 
banks and advances the existence of other control vari-
ables to be included in further research. it was found that 
the larger banks with headquarters located in the euro-
zone or countries with higher GdP per capita are likely to 
obtain lower Roa. likewise, the larger banks located in 
countries with higher GdP per capita obtain lower margins 
in their banking business (nim), but if they are located in 
the eurozone, nim improves. Previous literature (e.g., Kiel 
& nicholson, 2003) supports that the size of banks pos-
itively influences performance, which is contrary to the 
results of this study. the empirical observation shows dif-
ferent results depending on the context.
as in previous studies (iannotta et al., 2007; Bektas & 
Kaymak, 2009), we too failed to find any evidence of the 
influence of blockholders participation (F_Block) on per-
formance that is in line with the inconclusive results in 
literature. 
the same occurs with antitakeover measures (F_anti-take-
overi and F_antitakeoverii), that several authors consider 
positive (Beiner et al., 2006; seppo et al., 2011), F_insider-
Power, that according to Raheja (2005) distort the objectives 
due to the conflict of interests, F_Ceoduality that several 
authors (Pi & timme, 1993; larcker et al., 2007) believe to 
reduce the independence leading to decreased performance, 
F_Busydirectors, leading to weaker profitability (Ferris et al., 
2003; shivadasani & Fich, 2004), and F_Compmix that sev-
eral authors (Hanlon et al., 2003, Peng and Roell, 2008) 
consider positive but others consider negative (Brick et al., 
2006) or not related (vafeas, 1999).
conclusions
the results obtained show that in a crisis period, bank profit-
ability is affected by greater use of debt and insiders’ partici-
pation on the board. However, the results of the bank benefit 
from the higher age of managers and frequency of meet-
ings. We can also conclude that the value of banks on the 
stock market is hampered by the size of the board and the 
bank indebtedness. However, older managers take actions 
that are beneficial. Resorting to debt affects the margins 
of the banking activity but these margins benefit from the 
presence of affiliated members on the board committees.
another important conclusion is that size of the banks and 
the location of the headquarters in developed countries 
have a negative influence on the banks’ business margins 
and consequently on profitability. But the location of the 
same banks in the eurozone leads to better margins, thus 
contributing to prevent lower profitability.
Although this wasn’t the focus of the study, the share-
holder concentration levels raise the question of whether 
the expropriation of minority shareholders is more relevant 
than the collective action problems that characterize the 
economies in which widely dispersed shareholding prevail 
such as, for example, the U.s.
this study presents very important contributions to help 
understand the influence of governance mechanisms on 
the performance of banks in periods of crisis. additionally it 
contributes to understanding the influence of the countries 
development on the banks performance. We also highlight 
the influence of different financing options on the banks’ 
market value or business profitability. the results allow us 
to formulate a number of practical implications. First, we 
would like to attract the attention of the bankers to the 
crucial influence of high debt ratios on the bank perfor-
mance in times of crisis. in the period with high volatility of 
the market capitalization, it is important to realize that the 
debt-to-equity ratio will be volatile itself and may increase 
suddenly (what we observed in 2008). that leads us to 
an idea that it could be useful for a bank to constrain the 
financial leverage increase when the capital market vola-
tility is growing. second, we conclude that old directors 
96 rev.  innovar vol.  24,  núm. 53,  Julio-septiembre de 2014
INBAM  2013
on the board create value, so, it is important to have a 
number of experienced directors on the board in times of 
crisis. in our opinion, in times of crisis, the board faces the 
non-standard situations that need the understanding of 
potential crisis outcome scenarios. in such a situation, it 
is extremely important that the director has previous ex-
perience of the different types of financial crises and the 
changes of long-term business cycles. Finally, the evidence 
demonstrates that the higher frequency of board and com-
mittee meetings, although expensive, could be very profit-
able for a bank.
recommendations for future research
First of all, it is worth mentioning the sample limitation of 
the study. in this research, we used the data on corporate 
governance collected by hand from the annual reports of 
the banks that could drive the heterogeneity of the data, 
second, our study was limited to a time period with ex-
tremely high volatility in the capital markets that may af-
fect the forecast performance of the model when applying 
to the time periods with low capital market volatility. 
the assumptions about the composition of the governance 
factors, based on the works of larcker et al. (2007) and 
Grove et al. (2011), should be subject to separate analysis 
and aggregation of variables. in question are important 
differences between governance models and the research 
model that should also be applied to other activity sectors. 
the literature confirms the existence of nonlinear relation-
ships between corporate governance and performance, 
which should be developed in future work. it is also rel-
evant to study the role of family holdings in the corporate 
governance model in different contexts.
Recent research also demonstrates alleviation for the as-
sumptions of exogenous character of a number of corporate 
governance factors, especially those working with owner-
ship concentration. in this research, we used the classical 
assumption of the exogenous character of all these factors. 
is that an issue? is it a reliable assumption? First, to our 
mind, it would be interesting to introduce some ownership 
factors into the model as endogenous ones. But we should 
realize that the interpretation of the results would not be 
that clear in this case. second, as a key instrument we use 
panel regression analysis taking into account the time 
structure of data that alleviates the potential problems of 
endogeneity. nevertheless, we still consider the analysis of 
endogeneity as a potential direction for future research.
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